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Abstract— Botnet is most widespread and occurs commonly in 
today‘s cyber attacks, resulting in serious threats to our network 
assets and organization’s properties. Botnets are collections of 
compromised computers (Bots) which are remotely controlled by 
its originator (BotMaster) under a common Command-and-
Control (C&C) infrastructure. They are used to distribute 
commands to the Bots for malicious activities such as distributed 
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, spam and phishing. Most of the 
existing Botnet detection approaches concentrate only on 
particular Botnet command and control (C&C) protocols (e.g., 
IRC,HTTP) and structures (e.g., centralized), and can become 
ineffective as Botnets change their structure and C&C 
techniques. In this paper at first we provide taxonomy of Botnets 
C&C channels and evaluate well-known protocols which are 
being used in each of them. Then we proposed a new general 
detection framework which currently focuses on P2P based and 
IRC based Botnets. This proposed framework is based on 
definition of Botnets. Botnet has been defined as a group of bots 
that perform similar communication and malicious activity 
patterns within the same Botnet. The point that distinguishes our 
proposed detection framework from many other similar works is 
that there is no need for prior knowledge of Botnets such as 
Botnet signature. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Bot is a new type of malware [1] installed into a 
compromised computer which can be controlled remotely by 
BotMaster for executing some orders through the received 
commands. After the Bot code has been installed into the 
compromised computers, the computer becomes a Bot or 
Zombie [2]. Contrary to existing malware such as virus and 
worm which their main activities focus on attacking the 
infecting host, bots can receive commands from BotMaster 
and are used in distributed attack platform. 
Botnets are networks consisting of large number of Bots. 
Botnets are created by the BotMaster(a person or a group of 
person which control remote Bots) to setup a private 
communication infrastructure which can be used for malicious 
activities such as Distributed Denial-of-Service(DDoS), 
sending large amount of SPAM or phishing mails, and other 
nefarious purpose [ 3,4,5 ]. Bots infect a person’s computer in 
many ways. Bots usually disseminate themselves across the 
Internet by looking for vulnerable and unprotected computers 
to infect. When they find an unprotected computer, they infect 
it and then send a report to the BotMaster. The Bot stay hidden 
until they are announced by their BotMaster to perform an 
attack or task. Other ways in which attackers use to infect a 
computer in the Internet with Bot include sending email and 
using malicious websites, but common way is searching the 
Internet to look for vulnerable and unprotected computers [6] . 
The main difference between Botnet and other kind of 
malwares is the existence of Command-and-Control (C&C) 
infrastructure. The C&C allows Bots to receive commands and 
malicious capabilities, as devoted by BotMaster. BotMaster 
must ensure that their C&C infrastructure is sufficiently robust 
to manage thousands of distributed Bots across the globe, as 
well as resisting any attempts to shutdown the Botnets.  
Recently, attackers are also continually improving their 
approaches to protect their Botnets. The first generation of 
Botnets utilized the IRC (Internet Relay Chat) channels as 
their Common-and-Control (C&C) centers. The centralized 
C&C mechanism of such Botnet has made them vulnerable to 
being detected and disabled. Therefore, new generation of 
Botnet which can hide their C&C communication have 
emerged, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) based Botnets. The P2P Botnets 
do not suffer from a single point of failure, because they do 
not have centralized C&C servers [12]. Attackers have 
accordingly developed a range of strategies and techniques to 
protect their C&C infrastructure. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. In Section 2, we analyze different Botnet 
communication topologies and consider the protocols that are 
currently being used in each model. In Section 3, we review 
the related work. In Section 4, we describe our proposed 
detection framework and all its components and finally 
conclude in section 5. 
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II. BOTNET COMMUNICATION TOPOLOGIES 
According to the Command-and-Control(C&C) channel, we 
categorized Botnet topologies into two different models, the 
Centralized model and the Decentralized model. 
A. Centralized model 
In this model, one central point is in charge for exchanging 
commands and data between the BotMaster and Bots. In this 
model, BotMaster chooses a host (usually high bandwidth 
computer) to be the central point (Command-and-Control) 
server of all the Bots. The C&C server runs certain network 
services such as IRC or HTTP. The main advantage of this 
model is small message latency which cause BotMaster easily 
arranges Botnet and launch attacks. Since all connections 
happen through the C&C server, therefore, the C&C is a 
critical point in this model. In other words, C&C server is the 
weak point in this model. If somebody manages to discover 
and eliminates the C&C server, the entire Botnet will be 
useless and ineffective. Thus, it becomes the main negative 
aspect of this model.  
Since IRC and HTTP are two common protocols that C&C 
server uses for communication, we consider Botnets in this 
model based on IRC and HTTP. Figure 1 shows the basic 
communication architecture for a Centralized model. There are 
two central points that forward commands and data between 
the BotMaster and his Bots. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Command and control architecture of a Centralized model 
 
1) Botnet based on IRC : The IRC is a form of real-time 
Internet text messaging or synchronous conferencing [13]. The 
protocol is based on the Client-Server model, which can be 
used on many computers in distributed networks. Some 
advantages which made IRC protocol widely being used in 
remote communication for Botnets are: (1) Low latency 
communication; (2) Anonymous real-time communication; (3) 
Ability of Group (many-to-many) and Private (one-to-one) 
communication; (4) simple to setup and (5) simple commands. 
The basic commands are connect to servers, join channels and 
post messages in the channels; (6) Very flexibility in 
communication. Therefore IRC protocol is still the most 
popular protocol being used in Botnet communication [5].  
 
 
Figure 2. IRC based Botnet 
In this model, BotMasters can command their Bots as a 
whole or command a few of the Bots selectively using one-to-
one communication. The C&C server runs IRC service that is 
the same with other standard IRC service. BotMaster usually 
creates a designated channel on the C&C servers where all the 
Bots will connect, awaiting commands in the channel which 
will instruct each connected Bot to do the BotMaster’s 
bidding. Figure 2 showed that there is one central IRC server 
that forwards commands and data between the BotHerder and 
his Bots. 
2) Botnet based on HTTP: The HTTP protocol is another 
popular protocol used by Botnets. Since  IRC protocol within 
Botnets became well-known, more internet security 
researchers gave attention to monitoring  IRC traffic to detect 
Botnet. Consequently, attackers started to use HTTP protocol 
as a Command-and-Control communication channel to make 
Botnets become more difficult to detect. The main advantage 
of using the HTTP protocol is hiding Botnets traffics in 
normal web traffics, so it can easily bypasses firewalls with 
port-based filtering mechanisms and avoid IDS detection. 
Usually firewalls block incoming/outgoing traffic to unwanted 
ports, which often include the IRC port. There are some 
known Bots using the HTTP protocol, such as Bobax [16], 
ClickBot [13] and Rustock [17]. Gu et al in the reference [10] 
pointed out that the HTTP protocol is in a “pull” styleand the 
IRC is in a “push” style. However the architecture of both is 
same.  
B. Decentralized Model 
Due to main disadvantage of Centralized model attackers 
started to build alternative Botnet communication system that 
is much harder to discover and to destroy. Hence, they decided 
to find a model in which the communication system does not 
completely depending on only some selected servers and even 
discovering and destroying a number of Bots. As a result, 
attackers exploit the idea of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) 
communication as a Command-and-Control(C&C) pattern 
which is more resilient to failure in the network. The P2P 
based C&C model will be used significantly in Botnets in the 
near future, and definitely Botnets that use P2P based C&C 
model impose much bigger challenge for defense of networks. 
Since P2P based communication is more robust than 
Centralized C&C communication, more Botnets will move to 
use P2P protocol for their communication. 
     In the P2P model, as shown in Figure 3, there is no 
Centralized point for communication. Each Bot keeps some 
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connections to the other Bots of the Botnet. Bots act as both 
Clients and servers. A new Bot must know some addresses of 
the Botnet to connect there. If Bots in the Botnet are taken 
offline, the Botnet can still continue to operate under the 
control of BotMaster.  P2P Botnets aim at removing or hiding 
the central point of failure which is the main weakness and 
vulnerability of Centralized model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.    Example of Peer-to-peer Botnet Architecture 
     Some P2P Botnets operate to a certain extent decentralized 
and some completely decentralized. Those Botnets that are 
completely decentralized allow a BotMaster to inject a 
command into any Bots, and have it either be broadcasted to a 
specified node. Since P2P Botnets usually allow commands to 
be injected at any node in the network, the authentication of 
commands become essential to prevent other nodes from 
injecting incorrect commands.  
III. RELATED WORK 
Different approaches have been proposed for detection of 
Botnet. There are essentially two approaches for botnt 
detection. One approach is based on locating honeynets in the 
network. And another approach is monitoring and analysis of 
passive network traffic [20]. 
There are many papers discussed how to apply honeynets 
for Botnet detection [5,3,21,22,23,24,1,25,26]. Honeynets are 
functional to understand Botnet characteristics and 
technology, but cannot detect bot infection all the times. 
    We can categorize passive network traffic monitoring 
approach to signature-based, anomaly-based, DNS-based and 
mining-based. 
    Signature-based Botnet detection technique uses the 
signatures of current Botnets for its detection. For instance, 
Snort [27] is capable to monitor network traffic to find 
signature of existing bots. Signature-based detection approach 
is only capable to be used for detection of well-known 
Botnets. Consequently, this solution is not functional for 
unknown bots. 
    Anomaly-based detection approaches try to detect Botnets 
based on a number of network traffic anomalies such as high 
network latency, high volumes of traffic, traffic on unusual 
ports, and unusual system behavior that could show existence 
of bots in the network [28]. Nevertheless this technique meets 
the problem of detecting unknown Botnets, but is not capable 
to realize an IRC network Botnet which has not been used yet 
for attacks. To solve this, Binkley and Singh [14] proposed an 
effective algorithm that combines TCP-based anomaly 
detection with IRC tokenization and IRC message statistics to 
create a system that can clearly detect client Botnets. This 
algorithm can also reveal bot servers [14]. However, Binkley’s 
approach could be easily crushed by simply using a minor 
cipher to encode the IRC commands. 
    Lately, Gu et al. have proposed Botsniffer [13] that uses 
network-based anomaly detection to identify Botnet C&C 
channels in a local area network. Botsniffer is based on 
observation that bots within the same Botnet will likely reveal 
very strong similarities in their responses and activities. 
Therefore, it employs several correlation analysis algorithms 
to detect spatial-temporal correlation in network traffic with a 
very low false positive rate [13]. 
    DNS-based detection techniques are based on DNS 
information generated by a Botnet. As mentioned before, bots 
normally begin connection with C&C server to get commands. 
In order to access the C&C server bots carry out DNS queries 
to locate the particular C&C server that is typically hosted by 
a DDNS (Dynamic DNS) provider. Therefore, it is feasible to 
detect Botnet DNS traffic by DNS monitoring and detect DNS 
traffic anomalies [29, 30]. 
    In 2005, Dagon [31] proposed a method to discover Botnet 
C&C servers by detecting domain names with unusually high 
or temporally intense DDNS query rates. This method is 
similar to the approach proposed by Kristoff [32] in 2004.  
    In 2007, Choi et al. [29] suggested anomaly mechanism by 
monitoring group activities in DNS traffics. They defined 
some special features of DNS traffics to differentiate valid 
DNS queries from Botnet DNS queries. This method is more 
efficient than the prior approaches and can detect Botnet 
despite the type of bot by looking at their group activities in 
DNS traffic [29]. 
    Geobl and Holz [15] proposed Rishi in 2007. Rishi is 
primarily based on passive traffic monitoring for odd or 
suspicious IRC nicknames, IRC servers, and uncommon 
server ports. They use n-gram analysis and a scoring system to 
detect bots that use uncommon communication channels, 
which are commonly not detected by classical intrusion 
detection systems [15]. The disadvantages of this method are 
that it cannot detect encrypted communication as well as non-
IRC Botnets. 
    Strayer et al. [33] proposed a network-based approach for 
detecting Botnet traffic which used two step processes 
including separation of IRC flows at first, and then discover 
Botnet C&C traffic from normal IRC flows [33]. This 
technique is specific to IRC based Botnets. 
    Masud et al. [34] proposed effective flow-based Botnet 
traffic detection by mining multiple log files. They proposed 
several log correlation for C&C traffic detection. They 
categorize an entire flow to identify Botnet C&C traffic. This 
method can detect non-IRC Botnets[34]. 
    Botminer [35] is the most recent approach which applies 
data mining techniques for Botnet C&C traffic detection. 
Botminer is an improvement of Botsniffer [13]. It clusters 
similar communication traffic and similar malicious traffic. 
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Then, it performs cross cluster correlation to identify the hosts 
that share both similar communication patterns and similar 
malicious activity patterns. Botminer is an advanced Botnet 
detection tool which is independent of Botnet protocol and 
structure. Botminer can detect real-world Botnets including 
IRC-based, HTTP-based, and P2P Botnets with a very low 
false positive rate [35]. 
    As we mentioned above researches have proposed some 
approaches and techniques [14,15,16,13,17,18] for detecting 
Botnets. Majority of these approaches are developed for 
detecting IRC or HTTP based Botnets[14,15,18]. For instance, 
BotSniffer[13] is designed especially for detecting IRC and 
HTTP based Botnets. Rishi[15] is also desingned for detecting 
IRC based Botnets with using well-known IRC bot nickname 
patterns as signature. But recently we have witnessed that 
structure of Botnets moved from centralized to distributed 
(e.g., using P2P [9,19]). Consequently, the detection 
approaches designed for IRC or HTTP based Botnets may 
become ineffective against the new P2P based Botnets. 
Therefore, we need to develop a next generation Botnet 
detection system, which is also effective in the face of P2P 
based Botnets.  In addition, we have to take into consideration 
that this detection system should require no prior knowledge 
of particular Botnets (such as Botnet signature, or C&C server 
names/addresses). 
    In order to come up with a new detection system that also 
meet the requirements for detection of P2P based Botnets, we 
studied the communication and activity characteristics of few 
P2P based Botnet( e.g. Storm Worm) and eventually come up 
with effective definition of Botnets; specially for P2P based 
Botnet:  
 “A group of bots (at least three) within the same Botnet 
will perform similar communication and malicious activities”. 
Actually we share similar idea for definition of Botnet as 
proposed by Gu et al. in Botminer[35]. It means that if each 
bot within the same Botnet show different behavior (e.g. in 
terms of receiving instructions), the bots are only isolated 
infected systems that we cannot consider them as a Botnet 
based on our definition. According to definition above we 
proposed a new framework for detection of Botnets that 
mainly targets P2P based and IRC based Botnets, however the 
framework has the capability of adding another component for 
HTTP based Botnet detection. This framework monitors both 
the group of hosts that show similar communication pattern 
and performing malicious activities, and try to find common 
hosts on them. 
IV. PROPOSED BOTNET DETECTION FRAMEWORK AND 
COMPONENTS 
Our proposed framework is based on passively monitoring 
network traffics. This model is based on the definition of P2P 
Botnets that multiple bots within the same Botnet will perform 
similar communication patterns and malicious activities. Figure 
4 shows the architecture of our proposed Botnet detection 
system, which consist of 7 main components: Filtering, 
Application Classifier, Traffic Monitoring, Malicious Activity 
Detector, Analyzer, Monitoring & Clustering and Flows 
Analyzer.   
Filtering is responsible to filter out unrelated traffic flows.     
The main benefit of this stage is reducing the traffic workload 
and makes application classifier process more efficient.    
Application classifier is responsible for separating IRC and 
HTTP traffics from the rest of traffics. Malicious activity 
detector is responsible to analyze the traffics carefully and try 
to detect malicious activities that internal host may perform and 
separate those hosts and send to next stage. Traffic Monitoring 
is responsible to detect the group of hosts that have similar 
behavior and communication pattern by inspecting network 
traffics. Analyzer is responsible for comparing the results of 
previous parts (Traffic Monitoring and Malicious Activity 
Detector) and finding hosts that are common on the results of 
both parts. Monitoring & Clustering is responsible to monitor 
the traffic flows and cluster the similar flows to same database. 
Flows Analyzer is responsible to detect the group of hosts that 
have similar behavior and communication patterns by 
comparing databases that received from previous stage for 
detecting IRC based bots. 
A. Filtering 
    The main objective of Filtering is to reduce the traffic 
workload and makes the rest of the system perform more 
efficiently. Figure 5 shows the architecture of the filtering. 
 
Figure 5. Traffics filtering stages 
 
 
    In C1, we filter out those traffics which targets (destination 
IP address) are recognized servers and will unlikely host 
Botnet C&C servers. For this purpose we used the top 500 
websites on the web (Http://www.alexa.com/topsites), which 
the top 3 are google.com, facebook.com and yahoo.com.  
    In C2, we filter out handshaking processes (connection 
establishments) that are not completely established. 
Handshaking is an automated process of negotiation that 
dynamically sets parameters of a communications channel 
established between two entities before normal 
communication over the channel begins. It follows the 
physical establishment of the channel and precedes normal 
information transfer [36]. To establish a connection, TCP uses 
a three-way handshake; in this case we filter out the traffics 
that TCP handshaking have not completed. Like a host sends 
SYN packets without completing the TCP handshake. Based 
on our experience these flows are mostly caused by scanning 
activities. 
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Figure 4. Architecture overview of our proposed detection framework 
 
 
B. Application classifier 
Application Classifier is responsible to separate IRC and 
HTTP traffics from the rest of traffics and send them to 
Monitoring & Clustering and HTTP component. For detecting 
IRC traffics we can inspect the contents of each packet and try 
to match the data against a set of user defined strings. For this 
purpose we use payload inspection that only inspects the first 
few bytes of the payload and looking for specific strings. 
These IRC specific strings are NICK for the client’s nickname, 
PASS for a password, USER for the username, JOIN for 
joining a channel, OPER that says a regular user wants to 
become a channel operator and PRIVMSG that says the 
message is a private message [37]. Using this strategy for 
detecting IRC traffic is almost simple for most network 
intrusion detection software like Snort. In some cases 
botmasters are using encryption for securing their 
communication that make using packet content analysis 
strategy useless. This issue actually is not our target here. 
In next step, we also have to separate Http traffics and send 
to Centralized part. For this purpose we also can inspect the 
first few bytes of Http request and if it has certain pattern or 
strings, separate it and send it to centralized part. For detecting 
Http traffics we focus on concept of Http protocol. Like most 
network protocols, HTTP uses the client-server model: An 
HTTP client opens a connection and sends a request message 
to an HTTP server (e.g. "Get me the file 'home.html'"); the 
server then returns a response message, usually containing the 
resource that was requested("Here's the file", followed by the 
file itself). After delivering the response, the server closes the 
connection (making HTTP a stateless protocol, i.e. not 
maintaining any connection information between 
transactions).[38] 
In the format of Http request message, we are focusing on 
Http methods. Three common Http methods are “GET”, 
“HEAD”, or “POST”: [38] 
•  A GET is the most common Http method; it says 
"give me this resource" 
•  A HEAD request is similar to GET request, except it 
asks the server to return the response headers only, 
and not the actual resource (i.e. no message body). 
This is helpful to consider characteristics of resources 
without downloading it which can help in saving 
bandwidth. We use HEAD when no need for a file’s 
contents. 
• A POST request is used to send data to the server to 
be processed in some way, like by a CGI script. A 
POST request is different from a GET request in the 
following ways:  
• There's a block of data sent with the request, 
in the message body. There are usually extra 
headers to describe this message body. 
• The request URI is not a resource to 
retrieve; it's usually a program to handle the 
data you're sending.  
• The HTTP response is normally program 
output, not a static file.  
Therefore we inspect the traffics and if the first few bytes 
of an Http request contain “GET”, “POST” or “HEAP”, it’s 
the indication of Http protocol and will separate those flows 
and send them to Centralized part. After filtering out Http and 
IRC traffics, the remaining traffics that have the probability of 
containing P2P traffics are send to Traffic Monitoring part and 
Malicious Activity Detector. However in parallel we can use 
other approaches for identifying P2P traffics. We have to take 
into consideration that P2P traffic is one of the most 
challenging application types. Identifying P2P traffic is 
difficult both because of the large number of proprietary p2p 
protocols, and also due to the deliberate use of random port 
numbers for communication. Payload-based classification 
approaches tailored to p2p traffic have been presented in [41, 
40], while identification of p2p traffic through transport layer 
characteristics is proposed in [39]. Our suggestion for using 
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specific application or tools for identifying P2P traffics other 
than sending remaining traffics is use of BLINC [42] that can 
identify general P2P traffics. In contrast to previous methods, 
BLINC is based on observing and identifying patterns of host 
behavior at the transport layer. BLINC investigates these 
patterns at three levels of increasing detail (i) the social, (ii) 
the functional and (iii) the application level. This approach has 
two important features. First, it operates in the dark, having (a) 
no access to packet payload, (b) no knowledge of port 
numbers and (c) no additional information other than what 
current flow collectors provide.[42] 
C. Traffic Monitoring 
Traffic Monitoring is responsible to identify hosts that are 
likely part of Botnet during the time that hosts (bots) initiate 
attacks by analyzing flows characteristics and finding 
similarities among them. Therefore, we are capturing network 
flows and record some special information on each flow. We 
are using Audit Record Generation and Utilization System 
(ARGUS) which is an open source tool [43] for monitoring 
flows and record information that we need in this part. Each 
flow record has following information: Source IP(SIP) 
address, Destination IP(DIP) address, Source Port(SPORT), 
Destination Port(DPORT), Duration, Protocol(Pr), Number of 
packets(np) and Number of bytes(nb) transferred in both 
directions.  
 
Table 1. Recorded information of network flows 
fi SIP DIP Sport Dport Pr np nb duration 
f1         
f2         
 . 
. 
        
fn         
 
Then we insert this information on a data base like Table 1, 
which {fi}i=1…n  are network flows. After this stage we 
specify the period of time which is 6 hours and during each 6 
hours, all n flows that have same Source IP, Destination IP, 
Destination port and same protocol (TCP or UDP) are marked 
and for each network flow {fi} (row) we calculate Average 
number of bytes per second and Average number of bytes per 
packet:  
• Average number of bytes per second(nbps) = Number of 
bytes/ Duration  
• Average number of bytes per packet(nbpp) =  Number of 
Bytes/ Number of Packets 
Then, we insert this two new values (nbps and nbpp) including 
SIP and DIP of the flows that have been marked into another 
database, similar to Table 2 . Therefore, during the specified 
period of time (6 hours), we might have a set of database, 
{fi}i=1…m which each of these databases have same SIP, 
DIP, DPORT and protocol (TCP/UDP).  We are focusing just 
at TCP and UDP protocols in this part. 
As we mentioned earlier, the bots belonging to the same 
Botnet have same characteristics. They have similar behavior 
and communication pattern, especially when they want to 
update their commands from botmasters or aim to attack a 
target; their similar behaviors are more obvious. Therefore, 
next step is to looking for groups of Databases that are similar 
to each other.  
 
Table 2. Database for analogous flows 
SPort DPort  nbps nbpp 
    
    
 
    We proposed a simple solution for finding similarities 
among group of databases. For each database we can draw a 
graph in x-y axis, which x-axis is the average number of bytes 
per packet (nbpp) and y-axis is average number of byte per 
second (nbps). (X, Y)= (bpp, bps). 
    For example, in database (di), for each row we have nbpp 
that specify x-coordinate and have nbps that determine y-
coordinate. Both x-coordinate and y-coordinate determine a 
point (x,y) on the x-y axis graph. We do this procedure for all 
rows (network flows) of each database. At the end for each 
database we have number of points in the graph that by 
connecting those points to each other we have a curvy graph. 
We have an example, Figure 6, for two different databases 
based on data in our lab that their graphs are almost similar to 
each other. 
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Figure 6: Example of two similar graphs based on data in our lab 
 
Next step is comparing different x-y axis graphs, and 
during that period of time (each 6 hours) those graphs that are 
similar to each other are clustered in same category. The 
results will be some x-y axis graphs that are similar to each 
other. Each of these graphs is referring to their corresponding 
databases in previous step. We have to take record of SIP 
addresses of those hosts and send the list to next step for 
analyzing.  
D. Malicious Activity Detector 
In this part we have to analyze the outbound traffic from 
the network and try to detect the possible malicious activities 
that the internal machines are performing. Each host may 
perform different kind of malicious activity but Scanning and 
Spamming are the most common and efficient malicious 
activities a botmaster may command their bots to perform 
[44,26,45]. The outputs of this part are the list of hosts which 
performed malicious activities.  
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1) Scanning: Scanning activities may be used for malware 
propagation and DOS attacks. Most scan detection has been 
based on detecting N events within a time interval of T 
seconds. This approach has the problem that once the window 
size is known, the attackers can easily evade detection by 
increasing their scanning interval. Snort are also use this 
approaches. Snort version 2.0.2 uses two preprocessors. The 
first is packet-oriented, focusing on detecting malformed 
packets used for “stealth scanning” by tools such as nmap 
[46]. The second is connection oriented. It checks whether a 
given source IP address touched more than X number of ports 
or Y number of IP addresses within Z seconds. Snort’s 
parameters are tunable, but it suffers from the same drawbacks 
as Network Security Monitor(NSM)[47] since both rely on the 
same metrics [48]. Other work that are focusing on scan 
detection is by Staniford et al. on Stealthy Probing and 
Intrusion Correlation Engin( SPICE)[49]. SPICE is focusing 
on detecting stealthy scans, especially scans that spread across 
multiple source addresses and execute at very low rates. In 
SPICE there are anomaly scores for packets based on 
conditional probabilities derived from the SIP and DIP and 
ports. It uses simulated annealing to cluster packets together 
into port scan using heuristics that have developed from real 
scans[49]. An important need in our system is prompt 
response, however reaching to our goals which are promptness 
and accuracy in detecting malicious scanners is a difficult task. 
Another solution is also using Threshold Random 
Walk(TRW)[48], an online detection algorithm. TRW is based 
on sequential hypothesis testing.  
After assessing different approaches for detecting scanning 
activities, the best solution for using in this part is Statistical 
sCan Anomaly Detection Engine( SCADE)[16], a snort 
processor plug-in system which has two modules, one for 
inbound scan detection and another one for detecting outbound 
attack propagation. 
a) Inbound Scan Detection(ISD): In this part SCADE has 
focused on detection of scan activities based on ports that are 
usually used by malware. One of the good advantages of this 
procedure is that it is less vulnerable to DOS attacks, mainly 
because its memory trackers do not maintain per-external-
source-IP. SCADE here just tracks scans that are targeted to 
internal hosts. The bases of Inbound Scan Detection are on 
failed connection attempts. SCADE in this part has defined 
two types of ports: High-Severity (hs) ports which 
representing highly vulnerable and commonly exploited 
services and low-severity (ls) ports. For make it more 
applicable in current situation SCADE focused on TCP and 
UDP ports as high-secure and all other as low-secure ports. 
There are different weights to a failed scan attempt for 
different types of ports. 
The warning for ISD for a local host is produced based on an 
anomaly score that is calculated as based on this formula:   
                               S= (w1fhs + w2 fls) 
 fhs: indicate numbers of failed attempts at high-severity ports       
  fls: shows numbers of failed attempts at low-severity  ports 
           
b) Outbound Scan Detection (OSD): OSD is based on a 
voting scheme (AND, OR or MAJORITY). SCADE in this 
part has three parallel anomaly detection models that track all 
outbound connection per internal host: 
• Outbound scan rate (s1): Detects local hosts that perform 
high-rate scans for many external addresses.  
• Outbound connection failure rate (s2): Detects unusually 
high connection fail rates, with sensitivity to HS port usage. 
The anomaly score s2 is calculated based on this formula: 
                    
                           S2= (w1fhs + w2 fls)/C  
 
 fhs: indicate numbers of failed attempts at high-severity ports       
  fls: shows numbers of failed attempts at low-severity  ports 
C:  is the total number of scans from the host within a time   
        window. 
 
• Normalized entropy of scan target distribution (s3): 
Calculates a Zipf (power-law) distribution of outbound address 
connection patterns. A consistently distributed scan target 
model provides an indication of a possible outbound scan. It is 
used an anomaly scoring technique based on normalized 
entropy to identify such candidates: 
                              S3=H/ln (m) 
 
H: is the entropy of scan target distribution    
 
                        H= - ∑ pi ln(pi)                              
 
m: is the total number of scan targets 
pi:  is the percentage of the scans at target i 
 
2) Spam-related Activities: E-mail spam, known as 
Unsolicited Bulk Email (UBE), junk mail, is the practice of 
sending unwanted email messages, in large quantities to an 
indiscriminate set of recipients. More than 95% of email on 
the internet is spam[50], which most of these spam are sent 
from Botnets. A number of famous Botnets which have been 
used specially for sending spam are Storm Worm which is P2P 
Botnet and Bobax that used Http as its C&C. 
A common approach for detecting spam is the use of DNS 
Black/Black Hole List (DNSBL) such as 
(http://www.dnsbl.info/dnsbl-list.php). DNSBLs specify a list 
of spam senders’ IP addresses and SMTP servers are blocking 
the mail according to this list. This method is not efficient for 
bot-infected hosts, because legitimate IP addresses may be 
used for sending spam in our network. Creation or misuse of 
SMTP mail relays for spam is one of the most well-known 
exploitation of Botnets. As we know user-level client mail 
application use SMTP for sending messages to mail server for 
relaying. However for receiving messages, client application 
usually use Post Office Protocol (POP) or the Internet 
Message Access Protocol (IMAP) to access the mail box on a 
mail server. Our idea in this part is very simple and efficient. 
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Our target here is not recognizing which email message is 
spam, though for detecting group of bots that sending spam 
with detecting similarities among their actions and behaviors. 
Therefore the content of emails from internal network to 
external network is not important in our solution. All we want 
to do is determining which clients have been infected by bot 
and are sending spam. For reaching to this target, we are 
focusing on the number of emails sending by clients to 
different mail servers. Based on our experience in our lab, 
using different external mail servers for many times by same 
client is an indication of possible malicious activities. It means 
that it is unusual that a client in our network send many emails 
to the same mail server (SMTP server) in the period of time 
like one day. Therefore, we are inspecting outgoing traffic 
from our network( gateway), and recording SIP and DIP of 
those traffics that destination ports are 25( SMTP) or 
587(Submission) in the database. Based on network flows 
between internal hosts and external computers( SIP belong to 
mail servers) and the number of times that it can happen we 
can conclude which internal host is behaving unusual and are 
sending many emails to different or same mail servers.  
E. Analyzer 
Analyzer which is the last part of our proposed framework 
for detection of Botnets, is responsible for finding common 
hosts that appeared in the results of previous parts (Traffic 
Monitoring and Malicious Activity Detector).  
F. Monitoring and Clustering 
Since the architecture of communication between IRC 
server and bots is one-to-many (multicast) model, thus; the 
network flows to all bots should show similar characteristic 
and pattern. Our objective in this part is detection of IRC 
based Botnet by monitoring network traffics. Our approach in 
this part is based on identifying hosts that are likely part of a 
Botnet before initiating an attack, particularly during the time 
that IRC server commanding or updating their bots. 
Monitoring & Clustering is responsible to inspect network 
traffics and clustering the similar characteristics of network 
flows. Consequently, we are capturing network flows and 
record some special information in each flow. We are using 
ARGUS for monitoring flows and record information that we 
need in this part. Each flow record has following information: 
Source IP(SIP) address, Destination IP(DIP) address, Source 
Port(SPORT), Destination Port(DPORT), Duration(Dr), 
Protocol(Pr), Packet Arrival Time(PAT), Number of packets 
(np) and Number of bytes (nb) transferred in both directions. 
Then, we insert this information in a data base as shown in 
Table 3, in which {fi}i=1…n are network flows. 
After this stage, we specify the period of time which is 6 
hours and during each 6 hours, all n flows that have same 
Source IP, Destination IP, Source port, Destination port, 
Packet Arrival Time (PAT) and same protocol (TCP or UDP), 
are marked and then for each network flow (row) we calculate 
nbps and nbpp based on formula that mentioned earlier. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Recorded information of network flows 
fi SIP DIP Sport Dport Dr Pr PAT np nb 
f1          
f2          
 . 
. 
         
fn          
 
Then, we insert these two new values (nbps and nbpp) 
including SIP and DIP of the flows that have been marked into 
another database, similar to Table 2. Therefore, during the 
specified period of time (6 hours), we might have a set of 
database,{di}i=1…m in which each of these databases has the 
same SIP, DIP, DPORT, PAT and protocol (TCP/UDP). We 
are focusing just at TCP and UDP protocols in this part. These 
databases are sent to next stage, Flows analyzer, for finding 
similar databases. 
G. Flows Analyzer 
Flows Analyzer is responsible for looking a group of 
databases that are similar to each other. The comparison and 
finding analogous databases is similar to approach that has 
been described in Traffic Monitoring component. After 
finding similar databases we have to take a record of SIP 
addresses of those hosts and send them as a group of bot that 
are belong to IRC based Botnet. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The first seminar on Botnets was hold in 2007 and since 
then many Botnet detection techniques have been proposed 
and also some real bot detection systems have been 
implemented (e.g. BotHunter by Gu et al. [16]). Botnet 
detection is a challenging problem. In this paper at first we 
have defined taxonomy for better understanding of Botnets. 
Then we proposed a new general detection framework which 
currently focuses on P2P based Botnets and IRC based 
Botnets. This proposed framework is based on the definition 
of Botnets. Botnets have been defined as a group of bots that 
will perform similar communication and malicious activities 
pattern within the same Botnet. The point that distinguishes 
our proposed detection framework from many other similar 
works is that there is no need for prior knowledge of Botnets 
such as Botnet signature. In addition, we plan to further 
improve the efficiency of our proposed detection framework 
with adding unique detection method in HTTP part and make 
it as one general system for detection of Botnet and try to 
implement it in near future. 
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